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REPRESENTATIVE ANTITRUST SUITS BY FOREIGN
NATIONS: A CAUSE WITHOUT A CAUSE OF
ACTION
In the past three decades there has been a significant increase'
in United States corporate activity abroad.2 This increase occurred
primarily because it was economically profitable.3 The existence of
the multinational corporation gives rise to two competing interests:
the sovereignty of the foreign country, and the economic liberty
and power of the multinational corporation.' The foreign country
and the multinational corporation each prefer that the corpora-
tion's activity be conducted in a manner that is mutally beneficial.5
When multinational corporate operations result in harm to a
foreign country, a critical question arises regarding the action an
injured country should take to rectify the damage suffered by itself,
its citizens, or both, and to prevent the occurrence of future dam-
age. For example, if several United States multinational corpora-
tions were to conspire to fix prices on goods sold in a foreign
country, the injured country would have to decide whether to seek
the protection of the United States antitrust laws in the courts of the
United States, or to implement such tactics of self-help as legisla-
tion, negotiation, expulsion, or physical destruction.
1. [B]etween 1945 and 1973 American investment in foreign firms rose from $8
billion to $107.3 billion and foreign investment in American companies from $2.5
billion to $17.7 billion. According to a 1973 study by the United States Tariff
Commission, private institutions on the international financial scene, the majority
of which are multinational enterprises, controlled $268 billion in short-term liquid
assets at the end of 1971. This figure is more than twice the total of all interna-
tional reserves held by all central bank and international monetary institutions in
the world on the same date.
E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER 265 (1974).
2. United States corporations conducting business in foreign countries will be referred
to throughout this comment as multinational corporations.
3. The top 298 U.S.-based global corporations studied by the Department of
Commerce earn 40 percent of their entire net profits outside the United States. A
1972 study by Business International Corporation, a service organization for global
corporations, shows that 122 of the top U.S.-based multinational corporations had a
higher rate of profits from abroad than from domestic operations.
R. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH 16 (1974).
4. KINTER & JOELSON, supra note 1, at 265.
5. See generally Joseph, What Safeguards in Transnational Realm?, The Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, Jan. 5, 1977, at 11, col. 3.
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In the case of Pfizer v. Lord,6 the plaintiffs, foreign govern-
ments, elected to invoke the protection of the United States anti-
trust laws. In that case, several foreign governments filed antitrust
suits in the United States district court alleging that the defendants,
six United States pharmaceutical firms, conspired to fix prices on
certain antibiotics in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act of 1890.' The plaintiff governments prayed for treble damage
relief 8 under a parenspariae9 claim as "official representatives" of
their individual and corporate citizens who had purchased the de-
fendants' products. Additionally, plaintiffs sought treble damages,
on their own behalf, based on the purchase of defendants' products.
The Pfizer court held' ° that the plaintiff governments may not
sue on behalf of their citizens under a parens patriae method of
recovery because this method had been denied to states of the
United States. I I Addressing this point, the court stated that
"[p]rinciples of comity, international law and existing United States
treaties do not afford foreign sovereigns the right to press their citi-
zens' claims in a manner barred to domestic states vis- - vis their
6. 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub noa, Government of India v. Pfizer,
424 U.S. 950 (1976).
7. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
8. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained ....
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
The Supreme Court recently held that a foreign country is a "person" within the mean-
ing of section 4. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, -U.S.-, 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978). Further,
only those persons who are direct purchasers of the alleged violator of the antitrust laws are
persons injured in their business or property within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act.
Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1976). See note 22 infra.
9. The concept ofparenspatriae is derived from the English constitutional system.
As the system developed from its feudal beginnings, the King retained certain du-
ties and powers, which were referred to as the royal prerogative. These powers and
duties were said to be exercised by the King in his capacity as "father of the coun-
try." Traditionally, the term was used to refer to the King's power as guardian of
persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves.
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1971).
A parens patriae action is essentially a federal rule 23 class action, see note 17 infra,
without the rule's procedural requirements, such as adequate representation, notice, and
proof of each victim's damages. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266.
10. 522 F.2d 612, 617-18 (8th Cir. 1975).
11. Id. Of course, this holding does not preclude the plaintiff government from seek-
ing treble damages based on its own purchases of the defendant's products.
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citizens." '2 The court further noted that citizens of the plaintiff gov-
ernments may be denied due process of law'3 to which friendly
aliens from recognized governments are entitled' a if their govern-
ments seek to adjudicate their claims in the courts of the United
States without notice to the citizens, and an opportunity for the citi-
zens to participate in, or exclude themselves from, the litigation.' 5
Although plaintiff governments in Pfizer were denied recovery
under a parens patriae theory, three other methods 16 exist upon
which plaintiffs could represent their injured consumer citizens in a
United States court. These methods of recovery are a federal rule
23 class action,' 7 a parenspatriae action under the Antitrust Im-
provements Act, 8 and an expropriation action.' 9 It is the purpose
12. Id.
13. Id. at 619.
14. Russian Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1930). But see United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1941); Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 361 F.2d 106, 11 i-
12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966).
15. The right to a cause of action has been recognized as a property right within the
meaning of the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution. Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 448 (1932). Thus, what the Pfizer
court is strongly suggesting is that a citizen's right to a cause of action may not be taken
without notice and opportunity to be heard. The absence of such notice and opportunity is a
due process violation because a decision in favor of the plaintiff would be given resjudicata
effect and thereafter would preclude any plaintiff who has not excluded himself from the
action to sue the defendant at a later date. Accord Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43
(1940). The question whether there would be a denial of due process in such a situation was
left unanswered by the Pfizer court. 522 F.2d 612, 619 (8th Cir. 1975).
16. The term "method" refers to the theory by which a plaintiff might sue. For exam-
ple, assuming that plaintiff has been injured by an antitrust violation, he could elect to bring
an individual suit or a class action suit. The three methods of recovery discussed in this
comment are the only methods by which a foreign country could recover treble damages in
the courts of the United States for injuries to itself and its citizens sustained as a result of an
alleged price conspiracy.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
18. Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1394 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 (c)-(h)
(1976)).
19. Under this method of recovery, the foreign government expropriates its citizens'
right to a cause of action against the defendants and then seeks to enforce this right in the
courts of the United States. See Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1965).
For clarification, a literal reading of federal rule 23 and the Antitrust Improvements Act
indicates that the difference between the class action and the parenspatriae action is that in
the latter, the plaintiff state attorney general must comply with a significantly reduced
number of procedural requirements. For example, the Antitrust Improvements Act autho-
rizes notice by publication and measurement of damages by the "fluid-recovery" procedure,
an authorization designed to eliminate the problems of manageability associated with rule
23. [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4060. In general, recovery is more likely in a
parenspatriae action than in a class action. Id. at 4058-61.
The dichotomy between a rule 23 class action and an expropriation action is that in the
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of this comment to analyze these three methods of recovery" as
potential avenues of relief available to plaintiffs in a Pfizer fact sit-
uation,2' where United States multinational corporations allegedly
conspire to fix prices on goods sold in a foreign country, and where
that country seeks treble damages for those citizens who were direct
purchasers22 of the inflated goods by invoking the protection of the
latter, a citizen's right to a cause of action has been transferred to his expropriating govern-
ment. This transfer thereby precludes that citizen from suing on the right expropriated. See
Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 772 (1947). Because of this preclusion, it follows that the problems of due process
and multiple recovery which the procedural requirements of rule 23 are designed to guard
against are virtually eliminated.
The variance between a parenspatriae action and an expropriation action is essentially
the same as that between a rule 23 class action and expropriation.
Thus, the procedural requirements are extensive in the rule 23 class action, lessened in
the parenspatriae, and nonexistent in the expropriation action. Only in the expropriation
action does the plaintiff possess all the rights to a cause of action. Because the procedural
requirements are almost nonexistent in the expropriation action, it may be assumed that the
courts of the United States will be most reluctant to award recovery under this method. See
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1971); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479
F.2d. 1005, 1013 (2d Cir.), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1973).
20. Before a court concerns itself with the merits of the method upon which the plaintiff
foreign government is seeking recovery, such plaintiff must first be granted, by the executive
branch, the privilege to sue in the courts of the United States. "It has long been established
that only governments recognized by the United States and at peace with us are entitled to
access to our courts, and that it is within the exclusive power of the Executive Branch to
determine which nation are entitled to sue." Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, -U.S.-,
98 S. Ct. 584, 591 (1978). For a detailed discussion of this privilege, see Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410-12 (1964).
21. The analysis of this comment will be based only on a Pfizer type fact situation for
two reasons. First, since this is a comment on the Pfizer case, it seems appropriate to discuss
alternative methods of recovery on the same fact situation. Second, the area of antitrust law
is not free from confusion, and limiting the analysis of this comment to a price conspiracy
fact situation should achieve some simplicity. This is not to say, however, that the following
analysis will not apply to other fact situations.
22. For reasons to follow, a representative suit by a foreign country can include as
parties only direct purchasers of the inflated goods. Generally, a particular good passes
through the manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer before it reaches the final consumer. If,
for example, pharmaceutical manufacturers conspired to fix prices on their goods, they
would be an alleged violator of the antitrust laws. The wholesaler would be the direct pur-
chaser from this violator, and the retailer and consumer would be indirect purchasers.
Consistent with normal business practice, the wholesaler would pass on the costs in-
flated by virtue of the conspiracy, and the retailer would pass on the same to the consumer.
Because these inflated costs are passed on to the next purchaser, a question arises as to what
purchases should be deemed for purposes of section 4 of the Clayton Act to have suffered the
full injury from the overcharge.
In Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1976), the Court held that the pass-on theory
may not be used offensively by an indirect purchaser plaintiff against an alleged violator. In
other words, only direct purchasers (the immediate purchasers from the alleged violator) are
injured within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act. Accordingly, only direct pur-
chasers can invoke the protection of this section. In a Pfizer type fact situation, it follows
4
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United States antitrust laws.23 Attention will then focus on policy
arguments favoring relief.24 Finally, suggestions will be advanced
that would make antitrust relief more probable to a foreign country
whose citizens are injured by reason of an unlawful price conspir-
acy.
2 5
I. THE THREE POSSIBLE METHODS OF RECOVERY
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 - Class Actions
The first of these three methods, the federal rule 23 class ac-
tion,26 plays an integral role in our judicial system.27 This role was
underscored in Pfizer where the court stated that nothing in its
"opinion should be construed to prevent plaintiffs from represent-
ing their citizens within the confines of rule 23 if the district court
determines that the class should be certified under that rule."28
In class actions alleging antitrust violations, the courts hold
29
that, for a class to be certified, the plaintiff must satisfy the four
prerequisites of rule 23(a) and the prerequisite of subsection (b)(3)
of the rule, in addition to providing adequate notice. 30 Although
that a foreign country can represent only those citizens who were direct purchasers in an
antitrust action in the courts of the United States.
23. Because this comment deals primarily with the facts of Pfizer, the question of
whether United States antitrust laws have extraterritorial application, which would be at
issue if the United States were the plaintiff, will not be discussed.
24. Policy arguments disfavoring a grant of relief will not be made for two reasons.
First, such arguments already have been thoroughly discussed. See Velvel, Antitrust Suits
by Foreign Nations, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 10-16 (1975); JOSEPH, supra note 5, at 11. Second,
the strongest legal arguments tend to disfavor an award of antitrust relief to foreign nations
and the strongest policy arguments tend to favor an award of such relief. By eliminating
arguments disfavoring antitrust relief, hopefully a greater balance will be achieved.
25. It is important to note that the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61 et seq. (1976),
exempts certain export activity from the antitrust laws. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,
-U.S.-, 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978); United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393
U.S. 199 (1968). The exemption applies, however, only to those export activities which "do
not restrain trade or affect the price of exported products within the United States and do not
restrain the export trade of any domestic competition ...." 98 S. Ct. at 593 n. I (dissenting
opinion); 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976). A price conspiracy of the magnitude as that alleged in
Pfizer arguably would not come within the purview of the exemption.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
27. By establishing a technique whereby the claims of many individuals can be
resolved at the same time, the class suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious
litigation and provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for
claims which would otherwise be to small to warrant individual litigation.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968).
28. 522 F.2d at 620 (8th Cir. 1975).
29. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Ampicillin
Antitrust Litigation, 55 F.R.D. 269, 275 (D.D.C. 1972).
30. These prerequisites are set forth as follows:
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the prerequisites of adequate representation3  and notice32 may
present some difficulty to a plaintiff government, the most formida-
ble obstacle is the rule 23(c)(3) prerequisite "that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudi-
cation of the controversy. 33 There is considerable confusion as to
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numer-
ous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class ac-
tion if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudi-
cation of the controversy.
(c)(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
The rule states generally that plaintiff must satisfy all four requirements stated in rule
23(a) and at least one of the three requirements stated in rule 23(b). Since the federal district
court has original jurisdiction in antitrust cases, there is no jurisdictional amount require-
ment. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976). For a thorough discussion of rule 23, see 7 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 499 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 7 WRIGHT
& MILLER]; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1972)
[hereinafter cited as 7A WRIGHT & MILLER]; Note, Developments in the Law.- Class Actions,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1318 (1976).
31. Since the judgment in a class action suit will be given resjudicata effect, due proc-
ess requires that the absent members receive adequate representation. Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 44-46 (1940). In cases where a state is the representative party, the courts have not
hesitated to hold that the state attorneys general is an adequate representative of the class
members so long as the state itself has a claim against the defendant. Illinois v. Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (D. Ill. 1969); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp.,
44 F.R.D. 559 (D.Minn. 1968). This same reasoning should apply to a class action suit
brought by a foreign sovereign where the sovereign itself has a claim against the defendant.
Pfizer v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 617 (8th Cir. 1975).
32. The Supreme Court has left no doubt "that individual notice must be provided to
those class members who are identifiable through reasonable effort" and "that petitioner
must bear the cost of notice to the members of his class." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156, 175, 177 (1973). This decision makes it difficult for a party to bring a class action
suit where the cost of notice greatly exceeds his potential recovery. Eisen had an individual
stake of only $70, whereas the cost of notice to all identifiable class members was $315,000.
Id. at 167 n.7. However, in a Pfizer type fact situation, the differential between potential
damage recovery and cost of notice should not present the same difficulty to a foreign gov-
ernment as it does to a private individual because of the sovereign's greater access to capital.
33. In determining whether the prerequisites of rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied, the drafts-
men of the rule listed four factors thought to be particularly relevant.
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
6
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what satisfies this prerequisite. 34 The source of the confusion is the
rule 23(b)(3)(D) directive that a court evaluate "the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
3 5
"Commonly referred to as 'manageability', this consideration en-
compasses the whole range of practical problems that may render
the class action format inappropriate for a particular suit."3 6 Exam-
ples of practical problems that may render an action unmanageable
are the burdens of processing numerous claims, the difficulties of
distributing any ultimate recovery to the class members, and the
problems of notice.37
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,35 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit concluded that the only potential barrier to the
maintenance of the class action was subparagraph (D) of rule
23(b)(3). The court therefore directed the district court to conduct
"a further inquiry. . . in order to consider the mechanics involved
in the administration of the present action. 39
On remand, the district court held that the suit was maintain-
able as a class action.' Thereafter, the court of appeals reversed,
categorizing the class action unmanageable as defined in rule
23(b)(3)(D). 41 There were six million potential plaintiffs in the
class, and "[i]f each had to present his own personal claim for dam-
ages, the class, indeed, would not be manageable. '42 At least seven
other cases involving diverse and unidentifiable members of an al-
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the par-
ticular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3).
34. See Note, Developments in the Law: Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1498
(1976).
35. See note 33 supra.
36. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164 (1973).
37. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, at 75. See also Note, Developments in the
Law.- Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1498 (1976); Comment, Managing the Large
Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REV. 426 (1973).
38. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). For a more thorough discussion of the history and
legal implications of the Eisen cases, see Comment, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin-Fluid Re-
covery and Notice Requirements in Rule 23 (b)(3) Class Actions-A Strict Approach, 1973
UTAH L. REV. 489 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Comment-A Strict Approach]; Comment,
Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REV. 426 (1973).
39. 391 F.2d at 566-67 (2d Cir. 1968).
40. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
41. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1017 (2d Cir. 1973).
42. Id. One interpretation of why the court in this case decided that the class was
unmanageable is that "huge class actions expend more judicial time than the system can
bear." Comment-A Strict Approach, supra note 38, at 498-99.
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leged class have been dismissed as unmanageable. a3 In a class ac-
tion suit by a foreign government in a Pfizer type fact situation, it is
likely that the class, comprised of the government's agencies and
individual and corporate citizens, would be composed of a large
number of potential plaintiffs whose alleged damages are relatively
small.' Hence, the government would probably be faced with the
same problems of manageability which rendered the class action
unmanageable in Eisen.4" The problems of manageability associ-
ated with the large class action can be eliminated mainly by prov-
ing damages in the aggregate, instead of separately proving the fact
or amount of injury to each plaintiff.46 This procedure of assessing
damages is called "fluid-recovery".47 Although the "fluid-recovery"
43. In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 89-92 (9th Cir. 1974) (court calculated that
adjudicating claims of even 10% of the class of 40 million hotel guests would take approxi-
mately 100 years); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 599-601 (N.D. Ill. 1973)
(class of 30 million to 40 million automobile purchasers); Donson Stores, Inc. v. American
Bakeries Co., 1973-1 Trade Cases, § 74,387 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (all purchasers of bread in the
New York metropolitan area); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 553-54
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (class of over 500,000 consumers who paid a surcharge when renting an
automobile from defendant car rental agencies); Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53
F.R.D. 45, 64-74 (D.N.J. 1971) (class of 6 million retail consumers of gasoline in Delaware,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania); Reinisch v. NYSE, 52 F.R.D. 561, 563-64 (S.D.N.Y.) (all
purchasers of eggs in the United States). Wright and Miller argue:
In no event should the court use the possibility of becoming involved with the ad-
ministration of a complex lawsuit as a justification for evading the responsibilities
imposed on federal judges by [rjule 23. If judicial management of a class action, no
matter what its dimensions may be, will reap the rewards of efficiency and economy
for the entire system that the draftsmen of the federal rule envisioned, then the
individual judge should undertake the task.
7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, at 76.
44. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
only direct purchasers are injured within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act. See
note 22 supra. One logical effect of this decision is to reduce the size of the antitrust class
action, for now only direct purchasers can be represented in the suit. Consequently, one
might argue that the problems of manageability associated with the large antitrust class ac-
tion have been significantly eliminated. The contrary argument is that the decision in Ili-
nois Brick changed only the form in which the problem of manageability appears. That is,
the courts now have the additional burden of ascertaining who are the direct purchasers.
Whether the courts view this burden as a manageability problem remains to be seen.
45. In Eisen, the court stated that rule 23 "provides an excellent and workable proce-
dure in cases where the number of members of the class is not too large. It seems doubtful
that further amendments to Rule 23 can be expected to be effective where there are millions
of [class] members. ... 479 F.2d at 1019 (2d Cir. 1973).
46. Under this method of assessing damages, the problems of manageability are elimi-
nated because the number of claims filed are of no consequence. Id. at 1018.
47. The fluid-recovery procedure consists of three elements:
(1) a determination of damages to the "class as a whole" in order to establish a
general damage fund; (2) an opportunity for individual class members to file claims
and share directly in the fund (the processing of these claims is handled administra-
tively rather than judicially); and (3) a judicial determination of how to distribute
8
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procedure would relieve the court of the burden of processing
proofs of claim by individual members of the class,"8 the procedure
has been held "to be illegal, inadmissible as a solution of the man-
ageability problems of class actions, and wholly improper.
49
Contained within the recently enacted Antitrust Improvements
Act, however, is a section authorizing the use of the "fluid-recov-
ery" procedure of assessing damages in parens patriae actions
where the alleged wrong is a price conspiracy. 0 Should this section
withstand constitutional attack,5 ' there remains a question as to
whether the "fluid-recovery" procedure of assessing damages like-
the unclaimed residue of the fund for the benefit of the general class. Fluid class
recovery has been utilized only where the class is very large and individual claims
are relatively small. Such actions would be unmanageable if proof of each class
member's loss were required at trial.
Comment, A Strict Approach, supra note 38, at 491. See also Malina, Fluid Class Recovery
as a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 477 (1972); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1973).
An example of the mechanics of the fluid-recovery procedure is set forth as follows:
Assume that all retail outlets selling pencils in a given city agree to raise the
prevailing price of pencils two cents, and then proceed to carry out their illegal
conspiracy. . . .Assuming that all the criteria of rule 23 are met and a class action
on behalf of all pencil users in the city is approved, the court will proceed to try the
issues of violation and measure of damage in a single trial on behalf of the class.
The representative plaintiff would then have to prove the fact of the conspiracy and
the two-cent inflation of the price of each pencil during the conspiracy period. If the
plaintiff succeeds, the simple process of multiplying the defendants' total sales of
pencils by two cents will produce a gross damage figure which the court could then
incorporate into a judgment, thus creating a fund ....
Malina, supra at 488-89.
48. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d at 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1973).
49. Id. at 1018.
50. Section 4D of the Antitrust Improvements Act states:
In any action under section 4C(a)(1), in which there has been a determination
that a defendant agreed to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act, damages may
be proved and assessed in the aggregate by statistical or sampling methods, by the
computation of illegal overcharges, or by such other reasonable system of estimat-
ing aggregate damages as the court in its discretion may permit without the neces-
sity of separately proving the individual claim of, or amount of damage to, persons
on whose behalf the suit was brought.
Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1395 (1976).
51. The argument is that "proof of injury is an essential substantive element of the
successful treble damage action." Kline v. Caldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 233 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). For arguments supporting the unconstitution-
ality of the Antitrust Improvements Act, see 122 CONG. REC. S8, 853, S8, 855, S8, 983 (daily
ed. June 10, 1976). For an argument supporting the constitutionality of the section of the
Act authorizing fluid-recovery, see Comment, Managing the Large Class Action." Eisen v. Car-
lisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARv. L. REV. 426 (1973), where it is reasoned that
[wlere Congress to amend the antitrust laws to provide explicitly for the fluid recov-
ery, it is extremely unlikely that the Supreme Court would strike down such an
alteration. Congressional authority to govern economic behavior under the com-
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wise would be authorized in class actions.52 Because the problems
of manageability present the most formidable barrier to a foreign
government bringing a class action suit, the courts determination
on this question is crucial to the outcome of the suit.
B. Parens Patriae Action Under the Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976
An alternative method of recovery to the class action is the
parens patriae action authorized by the Antitrust Improvements
Act.53 The thrust of the Act is to overturn Caifornia v. Frito-Lay,
5 4
"by allowing state attorneys general to act as consumer advocates
in the enforcement process, while at the same time avoiding the
problems of manageability which some courts have found under
rule 23."" Although the Pfizer court ruled that a foreign govern-
ment is not entitled to a remedy that is not afforded a domestic
state,56 the court did suggest that a foreign government should be
entitled to a remedy that is afforded a state of the United States.
5 7
The Antitrust Improvements Act permits states attorneys general to
enforce the Sherman Act on behalf of injured consumer-citizens by
suing for treble damages under the parenspatriae theory. A strong
argument could be made that this same right to sue should extend
to foreign governments.
Reliance on the Pfizer decision in this situation, however,
would be misplaced. The issue is not whether foreign governments
should be on an equal footing with domestic states. Rather, the is-
sue is whether Congress intended to create a new cause of action
which could be employed by foreign governments. "It is clear
from the language of the. . . statute that the new cause of action is
created only for states attorneys general."5 8 Section 4(C)(a)(1) of
the statute reads:
52. In Eisen, Judge Medina stated that "as it now reads, amended Rule 23 contem-
plates and provides for no such procedure. Nor can amended Rule 23 be construed or
interpreted in such fashion as to permit such procedure." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479
F.2d at 1018 (2d Cir. 1973).
53. Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1394 (1976).
54. 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). In Frito-Lay, the court
held that California could not maintain aparenspatriae action for its injured citizens. See
also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
55. [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4060. For legislative history behind the Act,
see id. at 4054-130.
56. "Foreign creditors are to be afforded legal access to our courts on the same basis as
United States residents." 522 F.2d at 619 (8th Cir. 1975).
57. Id.
58. See letter from Howard E. O'Leary, Jr., Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Subcom-
10
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Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the
name of such State, as parenspatriae on behalf of natural per-
sons residing in such State; in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the defendant, to secure monetary
relief as provided in this section for injury sustained by such nat-
ural persons to their property by reason of any violation of the
Sherman Act.59
The strongest argument for extending the parenspatriae cause
of action to foreign governments has as its basis treaty agreements
such as The Treaty of Amity & Economic Relations6" between the
United States and Iran. The Pfizer court construed this treaty as
guaranteeing to Iran access to United States courts "on the same
terms available to United States nationals."'6 1 Since states attorneys
general can now bring a parenspatriae cause of action, one could
strongly contend that a foreign government should have a right to
the same cause of action.62
The parties to which Congress intended to grant the right to
bring a parenspatriae action, and the Pfizer court's interpretation
of the Amity Treaty between the United States and Iran, appear to
be in conflict. A literal reading of the Antitrust improvements Act
indicates that Congress apparently did not intend to extend the
right to foreign governments. 63 Conversely, the Pfizer court's inter-
pretation of the Amity Treaty suggests that foreign governments
should have access to courts of the United States on an equal basis
with states attorneys general.64
mittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, to Kim W. Cheatum, Sept. 21, 1976 [copy on file with
CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.].
59. Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1394 (1976) (emphasis added). "State," as used
in the statute, is defined as "a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, and any other territory or possession of the United States." Id.
60. Article 3 reads in part as follows:
Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party shall have freedom of
access to the courts of justice and administrative agencies within the territories of
the other High Contracting Party, in all degrees of jurisdiction, both in defense and
pursuit of their rights, to the end that prompt and impartial justice be done. Such
access shall be allowed in any event, upon terms no less favorable than those appli-
cable to nationals and companies of such other High Contracting Party or of any
third country.
The Treaty of Amity & Economic Relations, August 15, 1955, United States-Iran, [1957] 8
U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, cited in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 619 n.9 (8th Cir.
1975).
61. 522 F.2d 612, 619 n.9 (8th Cir. 1975).
62. In Pfizer, the court stated that "[floreign creditors are to be afforded legal access to
our courts on the same legal basis as United States residents." Id. at 619.
63. Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1394 (1976).
64. 522 F.2d 612, 619 (8th Cir. 1975).
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It is firmly entrenched in United States law, however, that a
conflict between domestic legislation and treaty agreement is re-
solved in favor of the one created subsequent in time.65 Since the
Amity Treaty preceded the Antitrust Improvements Act, the Act
should prevail. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the
parens patriae cause of action created in the Antitrust Improve-
ments Act will not be extended to a foreign government, at least
until a treaty agreement subsequent in time to the Act provides
otherwise.66
C Governmental Expropriation of Its Citizens' Claims
Assuming that a rule 23 class action or a parenspatriae action
cannot be employed by a foreign government as methods of recov-
ery, a third alternative, expropriation, must be considered. An ex-
propriation action differs markedly from a rule 23 class action and
a parens patriae suit brought pursuant to the Antitrust Improve-
ments Act.67 Under the expropriation method of recovery, the for-
eign government expropriates its citizens' right to bring a cause of
action and then individually6 seeks to enforce these acquired rights
in the courts of the United States.69 Because the citizens' rights have
been transferred to the expropriating government, these citizens
will not be denied due process of law if a United States court ren-
ders judgment in favor of the plaintiff government in the absence of
the citizens being given notice and opportunity to participate in, or
exclude themselves from, the litigation.70
65. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957).
66. A treaty subsequent in time to and in conflict with the Act should prevail. Id.
67. For an analysis of the differences, see note 19 supra.
Presumably an expropriation action would operate simplistically and hypothetically as
follows: United States multinational corporations X and Y conspire to fix prices on widgets
sold in country Z. Z expropriates its victimized citizens' rights to a cause of action and then
proceeds to enforce this right against corporations X and Yin a United States district court.
At trial, Z proves that X and Y each sold 100 widgets to consumers in country Z at a
price 10 cents higher than otherwise would be in the absence of the price conspiracy. As-
suming that Z is permitted to utilize the fluid-recovery procedure of assessing damages as
authorized in section 4 of the Antitrust Improvements Act, Z's damages trebled would be
$60 [((2 x 100) x $.10) x 3].
68. In contrast, a literal reading of federal rule 23 and the Antitrust Improvements Act
will indicate that under a rule 23 and parenspatriae action, the plaintiff is suing as a repre-
sentative of numerous other plaintiffs. See notes 18 and 19 supra.
69. See Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
70. This statement is supported by the following reasoning. Friendly aliens from rec-
ognized governments are entitled to due process of law, Russian Fleet v. United States, 282
U.S. 481, 489 (1931), and a right to a cause of action is a property right within the meaning of
12
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The ultimate issue in an expropriation action is whether the
taking of a citizen's right to maintain a suit will be judicially recog-
nized in the courts of the United States.7' The resolution of this
issue depends upon whether the act of state doctrine applies. 2 Ap-
plication of the act of state doctrine hinges upon whether the taking
occurs within or without the territory of the expropriating coun-
try.
73
The act of state doctrine was first defined in Underhill v. Her-
nandez74 :
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed
of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
75
The major underpinning of the act of state doctrine is to avoid con-
flict between the judiciary and executive branches concerning for-
eign relations.76 For this reason, the doctrine will not be extended
"to acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their
purely commercial operations." 7
These definitions delineate the scope of the doctrine, which ap-
plies only to acts of a state that occur within the state's territory.
Therefore, in a Pfizer type fact situation, the situs of a taking of the
the fifth amendment of the Constitution, Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 448 (1932). There-
fore, an alien's right to a cause of action cannot be taken without being given notice and
opportunity to be heard. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 619 (8th Cir. 1975). How-
ever, once the alien's right has been expropriated by its government, the alien no longer has a
property right protected by the due process clause. See Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Freres Soci~t6 Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). See also
note 15 supra.
71. Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1965).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
75. Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
76. The act of state doctrine . . . has its roots, not in the Constitution, but in the
notion of comity between independent sovereigns. . . .The line of cases from this
Court establishing the act of state doctrine justifies its existence primarily on the
basis that juridical review of acts of state or a foreign power could embarrass the
conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of government.
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765 (1972).
For a more detailed development of the doctrine, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964).
77. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 (1976). Thus, the act of
state doctrine, like the doctrine of sovereign immunity, will be applied only to public, as
opposed to commercial, acts.
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citizens' rights to maintain an action becomes the critical issue. If
the situs is outside the taking state's territory, the courts of the
United States will approve the taking only if it is "consistent with
the policy and the law of the United States."78 The courts of the
United States should recognize and give effect, however, to those
takings that occur within the taking state's territory that are not of a
commercial nature.79
Of great import here is the Hickenlooper Amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964.80 This amendment provides that no
court in the United States shall decline, on the basis of the act of
state doctrine, to review the validity of a claim to a property right
asserted by a party who acquired the right by expropriation. How-
ever, the amendment specifically exempts from its coverage "any
case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to interna-
tional law."81 Since "acts of a state directed against its own nation-
als do not give rise to questions of international law," 82 it is
reasonable to submit that the Hickenlooper Amendment does not
apply to the instant fact situation. Concerning the situs of a taking
of a right to a cause of action, case authority83 has established that
the situs of a resolution effecting the taking is of no consequence in
determining whether the act of state doctrine applies. In a Pfizer
type fact situation, foreign citizens' rights to maintain an antitrust
suit against United States multinational corporations are rights that
can be enforced only in the courts of the United States.84 Conse-
78. 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965).
79. 425 U.S. 682, 705-06 (1976); 168 U.S. at 252 (1897).
80. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976), held constitutional in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 185 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
81. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976).
82. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 861 (2d Cir. 1962) rev'd on
other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), cited in F. Palicio y Compania, S.A., v. Brush, 256 F.
Supp. 481, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), arj'd, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830
(1967).
83. Menendez v. Saks, 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nor. on other grounds,
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Tabacalera Severiano Jorge,
S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968); Repub-
lic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027
(1965). After King Faisal II of Iraq was killed, a revolution occurred and the new govern-
ment issued a decree confiscating all property of the dynasty wherever located. The new
government then brought suit to recover cash and stock King Faisal had in deposit with a
United States bank. United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic International, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 262
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), modified, 548 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976).
84. The court in Pfizer suggested that antitrust claims under the laws of the United
States are deemed located here because the claims may be enforced or collected only in the
courts of the United States. The court stated:
14
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quently, any expropriation of these rights would be a taking of
property outside the expropriating government's territory.85 There-
fore, such a taking would not be an act of state, which thereby per-
mits a court of the United States to pass judgment on the
expropriation of causes of action that have occurred prior to the
expropriation.86 Assuming the act of state doctrine is not applica-
ble,87 the remaining question is whether the taking will be recog-
nized in the courts of the United States.
An expropriation by a foreign government is consistent with
the law and policy of the United States if the expropriation is for a
public purpose, and is coupled with adequate, prompt, and effective
compensation. 8 Presumably the State Department can render an
[iut is settled that when foreign governments invoke the benefits of United States
courts to deal with tangible or intangible property located in this country, then their
actions and decrees with respect to that property will be upheld only if consonant
with the policy and law of the United States.
522 F.2d at 620 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Menenrdez v. Saks, 485 F.2d 1355, !365 (2d Cir.
1973), rev'dsub nom. on other grounds, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682 (1976); Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
85. A different conclusion might result if the foreign citizen has a similar right to a
cause of action pursuant to the municipal law of his country. In such a situation, the citizen
has a right to a cause of action that is enforceable in his country and the United States. It
could be contended, therefore, that an expropriation of this right occurs within the territory
of the taking state. Accordingly, in conformity with the act of state doctrine, a United States
court arguably should not pass judgment on the expropriation.
86. In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), the Supreme Court
affirmed the appellate court's holding that the interventors were entitled to the accounts re-
ceivable that matured after, but not before, the confiscation by the Republic of Cuba. Id. at
690. From this decision, it would seem to follow that an expropriating foreign government
would acquire those causes of action that accrue subsequent to the expropriation. For ex-
ample, assume that on January 1, 1977, sovereign Z issues a decree expropriating its citizens'
right to a cause of action, pursuant to the Sherman Act, whenever and wherever acquired.
On January 1, 1980, Z brings an action against X and Y in a United States district court
seeking treble damages for injuries to its citizens sustained as a result of an alleged price
conspiracy. At trial, Z proves that between January 1, 1977, and January 1, 1980, X and Y
each sold 100 widgets at $.10 higher than would otherwise be in the absence of a price con-
spiracy. Since the act of state doctrine should apply to all rights to a cause of action subse-
quent to the expropriating decree, Z should be able to recover damages trebled in the
amount of $60 [((2 x 100) x $.10) x 31.
87. The act of state doctrine could be rendered inapplicable for the additional reason
that the expropriation was an act of a commercial nature under Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
88. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 429 (1964). Consistent with
this legal principle is a letter to the Mexican Ambassador, dated April 3, 1940, in which
Secretary of State Hull writes:
The Government of the United States readily recognizes the right of a sovereign
state to expropriate property for public purposes. . . . On each occasion, however,
it has been stated with equal emphasis that the right to expropriate property is
coupled with and conditioned on the obligation to make adequate, effective and
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expropriation consistent with the law and policy of the United
States even in the absence of adequate compensation.89 In general,
it is reasonable to conclude that, in the absence of adequate com-
pensation or an expressed interest by the State Department, a gov-
ernment that expropriates its citizens' rights to a cause of action
cannot recover on those rights in the courts of the United States.
In summary, the rule 23 class action would be the method of
recovery most acceptable to United States courts; 90 however, the
problems of manageability may present an insurmountable obsta-
cle to a foreign government. Further, the procedural requirements
of rule 23, in addition to time, distance, cost, and language barriers,
may render the class action suit impracticable. Concerning the
parens patriae action authorized by the Antitrust Improvements
Act, there is no indication that Congress intended to extend the
right to this cause of action to foreign governments. Finally,
recovery under an expropriation action would be unlikely in the
absence of a showing that the expropriation was consistent with the
policy and law of the United States. Although the law does not
favor a foreign government seeking recovery in United States
prompt compensation. The legality of an expropriation is in fact dependent upon
the observance of this requirement.
III G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 662 (1942), cited in 8 M. WHITEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1020 (1967).
For a detailed analysis of public purpose and adequate, prompt and effective compensa-
tion, see 8 WHITEMAN, id. at 1036, 1143, 1164, 1183. For additional case authority on the
subject, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 185 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 956 (1968); United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic International, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 262, 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), modfed, 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976).
89. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972).
Moreover, in United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), and United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203 (1942), the Russian government assigned rights it acquired by nationalization to the
United States government via the Litvinov agreement. The Supreme Court held that the
United States could recover on the rights it had acquired even though no compensation was
provided by the Russian government to the citizens whose rights were taken. In Republic of
Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027
(1966), the court construed the Litvinov agreement as it concerns expropriations as follows:
By the Litvinov agreement our Government had procured, as an incident to recog-
nition, an assignment of the Soviet Union's claims to American assets of national-
ized Russian companies, for the benefit of United States nationals whose property
in the Soviet Union had been confiscated. Such action. . . was considered to make
the Soviet confiscation decrees consistent with the law andpolicy of the United States
from that time forward. . . . In this case, by contrast, nothing remotely resem-
bling the Litvinov agreement is present; on the contrary, the Department of State
has disclaimed any interest of the executive department in the outcome of the litiga-
tion.
Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
90. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1971).
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courts, there are strong policy arguments in support of granting
antitrust relief.
II. POLICY ARGUMENTS FAVORING ANTITRUST RELIEF
Policy arguments favoring antitrust relief 9' fall into four
broad categories, including considerations of domestic law, eco-
nomics, international ramifications, and practicality.92
A. Domestic Law Considerations
A major domestic law consideration arose from an interpreta-
tion of the Sherman Act by the Supreme Court in Northern Pacfic
Railroad Co. v. United States.93 Writing for the majority, Justice
Black reasoned that the Sherman Act
was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule
of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction
of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our eco-
nomic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic
political and social institutions.94
The import of Justice Black's statement is that competition is
good,95 and to this end section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes
"[e]very. . .conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations. "96
To insure that decisions in the marketplace are made in re-
sponse to the competitive forces, the United States Supreme Court
has repeatedly stressed the broad reach of actions for treble dam-
ages. In Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co.,97 the Supreme Court declared that the Sherman Act
does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or
to competitors, or to sellers . . . . The Act is comprehensive in
91. Arguments disfavoring antitrust relief will not be discussed for the reasons stated in
note 24 supra.
92. The four policy arguments made in this comment are not inclusive, but are argu-
ments that can be made in support of the proposition that victimized foreign countries
should be permitted to bring antitrust actions in the courts of the United States.
93. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
94. Id. at 4.
95. For an analysis of the value of competition, see AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 6-
26 (2d ed. 1974).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (emphasis added).
97. 334 U.S. 219 (1947).
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its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the
forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.9"
Similarly, in two other cases,99 the Supreme Court rejected defenses
that would have negated the treble damage actions.
These cases illustrate that actions which seek treble damages
are the most effective deterrent to price conspiracies in restraint of
trade. t°° With the amount of United States corporate activity in
foreign commerce increasing in significant proportions, 0 1 a greater
need exists to insure that this activity is held accountable to the
competitive forces praised by the Sherman Act. To this end, vic-
timized foreign nations should be encouraged to bring treble dam-
age actions in United States courts against United States
multinational corporations engaged in business abroad in a manner
that offends the letter and spirit of the antitrust laws. ' 0 2 To discour-
age these actions would be tantamount to encouraging multina-
tional corporations to engage in profitable anticompetitive practices
with impunity.0 3
B. Economic Considerations
In addition to strong domestic law considerations, equally
forceful economic arguments require that treble damages be
98. Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
99. In holding in Perma Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1967) that
the court of appeals erred in finding the common law inpara delicto doctrine a defense to
actions for treble damages, the Supreme Court reasoned:
[Tihe purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private
action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behav-
ior in violation of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 139.
In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United States Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), the
Supreme Court rejected the passing-on defense which would have negated the treble anti-
trust action. If the defense was upheld, the
ultimate consumers. . . would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest
in attempting a class action. In consequence, those who violate the antitrust laws
by price fixing or monopolizing would retain the fruit of their illegality because no
one was available who would bring suit against them. Treble damage actions, the
importance of which the Court has many times emphasized, would be substantially
reduced in effectiveness.
Id. at 494.
100. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, -U.S.-, 98 S. Ct. 584, 589 (1978). See also
Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318
(1965); Alaska v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 487 F.2d 191, 199-200 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
101. See notes I and 3 supra.
102. See Velvel, supra note 24, at 14.
103. Id. at 15.
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awarded. Price fixing conspiracies tend to result in the sale of
goods at prices higher than would exist in the absence of the con-
spiracy."4 The buyer of goods at inflated prices will offset the in-
crease by charging more on goods sold by him. The inflationary
spiral set into motion will slowly register itself in the prices of goods
exchanged on the international market, and, eventually, on goods
imported into the United States.1
0 5
Moreover, under basic supply and demand analysis, the sale of
goods at inflated prices would tend to lessen the demand that would
otherwise exist if the goods were priced in response to competitive
forces."° This decreased demand could be detrimental to the
United States balance of payments.10 7 Therefore, to negate poten-
tially adverse effects of inflation and a balance of payments deficit,
a foreign country injured by reason of antitrust violations should be
entitled to antitrust relief in United States courts.lOS
C International Ramofcations
A third consideration which favors the grant of antitrust relief
to foreign nations lies in the realm of international ramifications.
A sovereign has the right and duty to protect its citizens, a right and
duty supported by principles of international law and recognized
by the United States.'0 9 In French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy
Co.," the French Government brought an antitrust suit on behalf
of one of its nationals. The United States Supreme Court, by per-
mitting the suit, recognized that France was suing in a representa-
tive capacity:
[T]he French Republic has had no real interest in the product of
the springs for fifty years, and . . . it can have no such interest
for thirty years to come. ... To hold that the French Republic
104. Id. at 7-8.
105. Id; accord, Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, -U.S.-, 98 S. Ct. 584, 589 (1978);
see also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703 (1976).
106. Id. at 8.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. David Gantz of the Office of Legal Adviser, State Department, has written that
"Itihe protection of a national is not only the right but the duty of the State." A. RovINE,
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 334 (1973).
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appears in this litigation to be suing for the use and benefit of the
Vichy Company [the lessee of the springs] would more accu-
rately describe their relations."'
The French Republic was thus allowed to espouse its citizens'
claims in a United States court.
A contrary result, however, is suggested in language appearing
in United States v. Diekelman.I" 2 In that case, the Supreme Court
stated that in circumstances in which a sovereign assumes responsi-
bility for the claims of its citizens, "the claim may be prosecuted as
one nation proceeds, against another, not by suit in the courts, as of
right, but by diplomacy or, if need be, by war."' 3 Diekelman, how-
ever, can be distinguished from Saratoga to the extent that the for-
mer was a suit against a sovereign, the United States, while the
latter involved a suit against a private party, as was also the case in
Pfizer. 114
Similarly, in Republic of Iraq v. First National Bank of Chi-
cago, l" 5 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggested
that a sovereign may not bring an action in the United States on
behalf of its citizens against another private party. Addressing this
point, the court stated:
Federal courts will not entertain a suit at the instance of the
United States if the suit is in reality one between private parties.
We think the same rule applies in the case of a foreign nation.
If a sovereign nation chooses to assert against a foreign nation
private claims of its individual citizens it does so as a sovereign
vis-b-vis the foreign nation, not as a private litigant.116
Bank of Chicago is also distinguished from Saratoga in that the
persons for whom the Republic of Iraq sought to appoint a guard-
ian in Bank of Chicago were domiciled in the United States." 7
111. 191 U.S. at 438.
112. 92 U.S. 520 (1876).
113. Id. at 524.
114. As a result, a number of sovereign immunity issues that are present in a case such
as Diekelman are not present in an action against a private party such as that involved in a
Pfizer type fact situation.
115. 350 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 982 (1966).
116. Id. at 648-49.
117. The Republic of Iraq, after issuing a decree that appointed a guardian of the per-
sons and estates of certain minor children residing in Chicago, Illinois, brought suit seeking
judicial recognition of the decree in the Probate Court of Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff also
alleged that the children, under the Iraqi nationality laws, were Iraqi citizens. However, the
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Conversely, in Saratoga, the persons represented were domiciled in
the plaintiff nation.
In a Pfizer situation, citizens injured by the price conspiracy
are similarly domiciled in the plaintiff nation. Further, because of
time, distance, costs, and language barriers, it is reasonable to con-
clude that these citizens must be protected by their government if
they are to receive protection at all. Thus, because a sovereign has
the duty to champion its citizens' claims, especially in circum-
stances where it is difficult, if not impossible, for the citizens to
champion their own claims,' 8 an argument can be made that a sov-
ereign injured by reason of antitrust violations should be allowed to
fulfill this duty in the courts of the United States.
Another international consideration that favors antitrust relief
for foreign sovereigns can be found in agreements to which sover-
eigns are parties. For example, in the Bretton-Woods Agreements
Act, 1 9 Congress urged foreign government members of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund to take immediate steps "[to] reduce ob-
stacles to and restrictions upon international trade" and to
"eliminate unfair trade practices" in international trade. One
could argue that the elimination of unfair trade practices would be
achieved, in part, by allowing sovereigns a treble damage remedy
for injuries sustained as a result of a price conspiracy by multina-
tional corporations.
D. Practical Considerations
The last argument in favor of antitrust relief is based on practi-
cal considerations. At lease one English tribunal has argued that
the more difficult it is for sovereigns to recover in English courts,
the more likely it is that these sovereigns will implement their own
children were already under the protection and guardianship of the same probate court.
The court refused to recognize the decrees, stating:
where the children have never been in Iraq and were residing in Chicago with their
parents since 1957 or 1958, it is clear that the courts of Illinois would not recognize
the Iraqi decrees, and that these principles apply with equal, if not greater, force to
the question of the guardianship of the estates located in Illinois.
350 F.2d at 649 (7th Cir. 1965).
118. See note 109 supra.
119. 22 U.S.C. § 286k (1976). Although the Bretton Woods System effectively collapsed
in 197 1, the system is ostensibly being revived by the Trilateral Commission. See Novak,
New World Economic System Dawns, The Christain Science Monitor, Feb. 7, 1977, at 18, col.
1.
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remedies, such as expulsion, nationalization, or physical destruc-
tion. 120 In support of this position, the spokesman for the court
stated:
I conceive that there can be no doubt thai a sovereign may sue. If
he cannot, there is a right without a remedy . . . . [H]e sues as
every sovereign must sue, generally speaking, either on his own
behalf, or on behalf of his subjects. If the courts of justice were
to refuse to receive his suit, I apprehend that it might be a just
cause of war.
12 1
Although the likelihood of war is small, it is conceivable that a for-
eign country that has been denied antitrust relief might resort to
remedial measures more harmful to United States multinational
corporations than an action for treble damages. Accordingly, the
United States should prefer, as a practical matter, that the outcome
of an antitrust action against a United States multinational corpo-
ration be determined in accordance with United States law, rather
than the law of a foreign country.
III. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis illustrates that, despite strong policy ar-
guments to the contrary, it is unlikely that foreign countries injured
by a price conspiracy will be able to successfully maintain either a
class action, a parenspatriae action, or an expropriation action for
treble damages in the courts of the United States. Nevertheless,
some suggestions have been advanced that may render antitrust re-
lief more probable to an injured foreign country.
It has been noted that the problems of manageability associ-
ated with the large class action present the most formidable obsta-
cle to a foreign nation. 22 However, these problems can be
eliminated to a large extent by the "fluid-recovery" procedure of
assessing damages.' 23 Now that this procedure has been authorized
by the Antitrust Improvements Act 1 24 in situations where the al-
leged wrong is a price conspiracy, a similar authorization by the
courts in class action suits would greatly enhance the chances of
recovery for a plaintiff foreign government where the class it pur-
ports to represent is large.
120. Hullet v. King of Spain, I Dow & Cl. 169, 175, 28 Rev. Reports 56, 61-62 (1828),
cited in The Sapphire v. Napoleon, Emperor of France, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 167, 168 (1870).
121. Id.
122. See notes 33-43 supra, and accompanying text.
123. See note 47 supra, and accompanying text.
124. Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1394 (1976).
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There is no indication that Congress intended to extend to for-
eign governments the parenspatriae action created by the Antitrust
Improvements Act. 25 However, there exist amity treaties which
suggest that foreign governments should have access to courts of
the United States on the same terms as that afforded states attor-
neys general. 126 Since this apparent conflict between domestic legis-
lation and treaty agreement traditionally has been resolved in favor
of the one subsequent in time, Many similar amity treaty subse-
quent to the Act would permit the signatory to the treaty to employ
the parenspatriae action. Treaty agreements which guarantee for-
eign nations access to courts of the United States on the same terms
available to domestic states can, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, be effectuated by the Executive Branch.
28
In an expropriation action, the taking, by a sovereign, of a citi-
zen's antitrust claim constitutes a "taking" of property outside the
expropriating government's territory. 129 Therefore, such a taking'is
not an act of state. 130 Accordingly, the taking will not be recognized
in the courts of the United States, absent of a showing that the tak-
ing was for a public purpose and accompanied by adequate com-
pensation. 131 Presumably, however, the State Department can
render an expropriation consistent with the law and policy of the
United States, even in the absence of adequate compensation, by
expressing a sufficient interest in the controversy. 32 Thus, the posi-
tion of the State Department could be crucial to the outcome of an
expropriation action.
The significance of these suggestions is underscored by the
dramatic increase in United States corporate activity abroad. If
multinational corporations are allowed to charge monopolistic
prices with impunity, the United States risks losing substantial ben-
efits garnered by its corporate activity in international commerce.
Therefore, foreign countries genuinely wronged by price conspira-
cies should be entitled to maintain actions for treble damages in the
125. See notes 58 and 59 5upra, and accompanying text.
126. See notes 60-62 supra, and accompanying text.
127. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957).
128. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
129. See note 84 supra, and accompanying text.
130. See note 85 supra, and accompanying text.
131. See note 88 supra, and accompanying text.
132. See note 89 supra, and accompanying text.
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courts of the United States. Permitting the maintenance of such
actions will further insure that decisions by United States corpora-
tions in the international marketplace will be held accountable to
the competitive forces extolled by the Sherman Act.
Kim W Cheatum
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